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Abstract 
Research on public value is inevitably interdisciplinary in its nature due to its aim and 
purpose. Both philosophical and empirical approaches are necessary to conduct such research in 
a successful manner. In the present paper, I intend to discuss the importance of empirical 
approaches in research on public values, particularly psychological and neuroscientific 
approaches, with concrete examples. I proposed that such empirical approaches are essential in 
better understanding the processes and mechanisms associated with how people address issues 
associated with public value in the modern society. Also, I overviewed how the psychological 
and neuroscientific approaches contribute to practical aspects related to public value, such as 
policy making and education. Based on the aforementioned points, I briefly discussed directions 
for future research in research on public value as an interdisciplinary field. 
Keywords: public value, psychology, neuroscience, psychological processes, policy 
making, education  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON PUBLIC VALUE  3 
Public Value, Psychology, and Neuroscience 
Research on which values should be pursued among the public and how to promote them 
in the reality, research on public value, should be multi- and/or interdisciplinary in its nature. For 
instance, on the one hand, if we are interested in composing a list of values that should be 
prioritized and emphasized among different groups of people, then we need to refer to 
philosophical accounts to justify such a list at least at the conceptual level (Bryson et al., 2015). 
On other hand, we also need to consider practical aspects related to research on public value as 
well (Meynhardt, 2009). Even if we have a list of values to be commonly pursued, which has 
been justified by philosophical and conceptual accounts, the mere presence of the list does not 
necessarily assure its successful implementation in the reality (Darnell et al., 2019). We can 
imagine several practical questions regarding the implementation of public value that cannot be 
easily answered by philosophical, abstract, and/or conceptual considerations. For example, 
practical ideas about how to persuade the public in an effective way to make the public endorse 
and implement the listed values could not be feasibly acquired solely by philosophical works 
(Hartley et al., 2017). Such a point suggests that empirical works are also essential in research on 
public value (Hartley et al., 2017; Meynhardt, 2009). 
In this paper, given the aforementioned point regarding the necessity of empirical 
research on public value, I intend to review previous research in psychology and neuroscience 
relevant to public value. Previous empirical studies in the fields will be able to provide us with 
useful insights about the mechanisms associated with how people perceive and evaluate values 
and how to utilize various interventions in different settings to motivate people to accept and 
implement values in an effective way. Thus, reviewing psychological and neuroscientific studies 
relevant to public value would be worthwhile to improve research on public value as a field. To 
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examine the aforementioned point, in this paper, I will two themes of studies in two fields, 
psychology and neuroscience. First, I intend to introduce previous empirical studies that 
examined human processes associated with public value at the psychological and neural levels. 
Second, I will also overview prior research on the development of educational and psychological 
interventions to promote people’s behavior implementing public value. Based on the overview of 
the relevant previous studies, I will briefly discuss how psychology and neuroscience can 
contribute to our endeavors to study public value. 
Potential contributions of psychological studies to research on public value 
Psychological and neuroscientific studies can provide useful insights about diverse values 
endorsed by the public based on evidence (e.g., Graham et al. 2011). In addition, empirical 
studies focusing on psychological and neural processes associated with values, such as how 
people perceive different values and how they differently response to them, can widen our 
understanding of public value (e.g., Emonds et al. 2011). Without further understanding of the 
aforementioned mechanisms or processes, it is impossible to design and implement interventions 
and policies to promote implementations of public value in the reality (Hartley et al., 2017). 
Hence, such previous studies in psychology and neuroscience would be useful resources when 
we start our interdisciplinary research on public value. 
I shall overview psychological studies that particularly focused on describing value 
endorsement across diverse groups of people. In the field of moral psychology, which is 
primarily concerned about values and virtues, the moral foundations theory (MFT) that proposed 
by Graham et al. (2011) would be an exemplary theoretical framework showing how 
psychological works can contribute to describing diverse public values for their accurate 
understanding. According to the MFT, different people endorse and refer to different moral 
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foundations while making a moral judgment or evaluation (e.g., Graham et al. 2009). The 
aforementioned foundations are care, fairness, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
sanctity/purity (Graham et al., 2011). Before the emergence of the MFT, the majority of moral 
psychologists focused on the unidimensional aspect of morality, such as care vs. harm or fairness 
vs. cheating, instead of examining the diverse values endorsed by different groups (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Han & Dawson, 2021). When Graham et al. (2013) conducted their study by 
collecting data across different countries and cultures, they found that values endorsed by diverse 
populations could not be well explained by one dimension. Instead, they proposed that such 
values should be described in multiple dimensions, the five foundations proposed in the MFT. 
Since then, the MFT framework has enabled researchers in morality and values to acknowledge 
the diversity of values associated with morality across different groups of people in the globe.  
Of course, there have been criticisms to the MFT in the field as well. Gray and Keeney 
(2015) argued that four foundations other than care can be explained by one dimension, 
harm/care. Gray and Keeney's (2015) epistemological account proposes that different moral 
foundations are in fact diversification of the primary dimension, harm/care, in different contexts. 
Also, moral psychologists who were interested in normative and prescriptive aspects of morality 
have also argued that the MFT is not capable of producing meaningful norms or prescriptions 
although it significantly contributed to describing human morality. For instance, in line with 
Gray and Keeney's (2015) argument at the epistemological level, Han and Dawson (2021) 
reported that sophisticated moral reasoning was positively associated with individualizing 
foundations, care and fairness, not binding foundations, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
sanctity/purity. Hence, from these critiques, we can see that although a theory might well 
describe different values and their endorsement across different groups, it could not be very 
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informative in inquiries regarding normative or prescriptive aspects of morality (e.g., Blum, 
2013). 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, descriptive works in psychology, such as what 
the MFT have done, will be able to inform our research on public value in the long run. One of 
the most significant contributions is that MFT researchers demonstrated the differences in 
endorsed values across people with different political orientations (e.g., liberal vs. conservative, 
religious orientations, etc.) that had not been well studied (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 
2007). Such findings informed Haidt's (2012) further examination regarding how to address 
severe value-related conflicts between people with different orientations occurring in the modern 
society. Although the MFT and other descriptive studies on values would not be able to provide 
significant normative or prescriptive implications in a direct manner, the aforementioned case 
suggests that such descriptive works can provide researchers and policy makers with basic data 
about the current status so that they can invent effective practical solutions to address social 
issues related to values.  
Moreover, a recent psychological study has proposed an effective psychological 
intervention using personal experiences to address the severe political polarization associated 
with conflicts between values. Kubin et al. (2021) demonstrated that conflicts originating from 
the endorsement of different values between participants with different political orientations can 
be better addressed by sharing concrete personal experiences instead of presenting factual 
information. This line of research would provide us with some considerable solutions that can 
practically address conflicts between people endorsing different political views, and finally, 
different values based on empirical evidence. As shown in the previously introduced exemplary 
psychological studies, empirical studies in psychology addressing morality and values can help 
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us better describe diverse values existing and endorsed across diverse groups of people and 
explore potential solutions to address value-involved conflicts.  
Potential Contributions of Neuroscientific Studies to Research on Public Value 
In addition to the aforementioned psychological works regarding public value, studies in 
neuroscience that address the psychological and neural processes associated with how such 
values are perceived and processed can also provide us with useful insights (Han, 2019; Han et 
al., 2019; Illes et al., 2010; Kelly & O’Connell, 2020). Particularly, research on such processes is 
informative while considering practical solutions to address conflicts between different groups 
endorsing different sets of values in modern society where has been highly diversified (e.g., 
Greene, 2013).  
Among previous neuroscientific studies, we may refer to works done by Greene (2009) 
that proposed the dual process model regarding how a human brain addresses dilemmas 
associated with morality and values. In their original neuroimaging study, Greene et al. (2001) 
reported that two distinctive psychological processes, cognitive and affective processes, are 
activated while solving moral dilemmas. When people are dealing with moral dilemmas that 
directly present concrete harms to people (i.e., moral-personal dilemmas), brain regions 
associated with affective processes, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, showed 
significant activity. On the other hand, when they were solving hypothetical moral dilemmas 
(i.e., moral-impersonal dilemmas), brain regions correlated with cognitive and arithmetic 
processes were significantly activated. From the findings, Greene (2009) proposed the dual 
process model that describes two distinctive cognitive and affective pathways in value-engaged 
problem solving (May et al., 2021). When people are addressing relatively simple problems 
involving only minimal conflicts, they can utilize the affective processes implementing heuristics 
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to save time and energy. However, when they encounter complicated problems, the activation of 
the slower cognitive processes for sophisticated reasoning becomes necessary.  
The model would show us different psychological processes involving solution of value-
related problems with different degrees of complexity at the neural level. Additionally, Greene 
(2013) emphasized the role of reasoning-based processes to address complicated conflicts 
between values endorsed by different groups of people based on the model. In fact, Haidt (2012) 
also proposed measures to address such conflicts. The measures were based on assumptions, 
which were different from Greene’s (2013), such as the multitude of values and importance of 
intuitive processes in judgment proposed in the MFT (Graham et al., 2011). Unlike Haidt (2012), 
Greene (2013) suggested several prescriptive guidelines underscoring the roles of reasoning, 
instead of intuition, in conflict solving based on the dual process model based on neuroimaging 
evidence. Of course, there have been critiques to the validity of Greene's (2009, 2013) accounts 
raised by moral philosophers (e.g., Königs, 2018). Despite the criticisms, at least, we may 
acknowledge potential values of neuroimaging works in consideration of prescriptive and 
practical solutions to address issues associated with conflicts between values in the highly 
diversified modern society. 
Furthermore, related to educational programs for the promotion of public value, previous 
research in neuroscience would provide us with useful insights about how to improve the 
effectiveness of such programs in class settings (Han, 2019). Even if people understand that 
certain values should be endorsed and pursued, they do not necessary implement such values in 
their actual behavior. As discussed by Darnell et al. (2019), the gappniess issue, which is about 
the gap between one’s belief and behavior, has been one of the major issues in moral education 
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and psychology (Blasi, 1980; Han, 2014). Hence, we need to consider how to address the 
gappiness in promoting public value, particularly its behavioral implementations.  
A recent work in educational neuroscience that focused on the neural correlates of moral 
functioning, and developed and tested an educational intervention based on the findings from the 
neural-level investigations would be informative for the aforementioned consideration (Han et 
al., 2019). As an example, we may overview a moral educational intervention using different 
types of the stories of exemplars (Han et al., 2017). Because moral exemplars present moral 
values that shall be pursued and implemented in actions with concrete behavioral examples, 
presenting the stories of such exemplars has been regarded as one of major educational methods 
in moral education (Damon & Colby, 2013). Such an approach is particularly supported by the 
perspective of social learning, which emphasizes roles of models in promoting motivation for 
imitation and emulation (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Sanderse, 2012). However, Monin (2007) 
and Monin et al. (2008) reported that the mere presentation of exemplary stories, particularly the 
stories of distant exemplars that are perceived to be extraordinary and non-relatable to people, 
may backfire. Such extreme stories are likely to produce negative emotional and motivational 
responses instead of motivation for emulation.  
To address the aforementioned issue, Han et al. (2017) examined which types of 
exemplary stories would work more effectively while minimizing the potential negative 
outcomes. To develop an effective psychological intervention, it is important to identify which 
psychological processes are closely involved in the targeted outcomes, i.e., motivational and 
behavioral outcomes (Walton, 2014; Yeager & Walton, 2011). Thus, as an effort to identify the 
processes, Han (2017) conducted meta-analysis of the previous fMRI studies related to moral 
functioning and Han et al. (2016) conducted an fMRI experiment examining the interaction 
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between brain regions associated with selfhood and moral emotion and motivation. According to 
Han et al. (2016), these findings suggested the close association between one’s selfhood and 
moral motivation in general (Boccia et al., 2016; Englander et al., 2012; Garrigan et al., 2016; 
Han, 2020). Based on the results from the neuroimaging studies, Han et al., (2017) examined 
whether the closeness of the presented exemplars to participants (e.g., whether the exemplars are 
perceived to be attainable and relatable) influenced moral motivation when exemplary stories 
were presented. As hypothesized, they reported that the stories of close moral exemplars, such as 
family members and friends, more effectively promoted motivation to engage in voluntary 
activities compared with the stories of distant exemplars, such as historic figures. In short, the 
findings from the intervention study suggest that the perceived connectivity between the 
presented exemplars and participants significantly influence the motivational outcome of the 
intervention, so this point might need to be considered while designing effective programs for 
moral education using exemplary stories. 
This concrete example in moral education may demonstrate how findings from 
neuroimaging studies can inform the development of interventions to promote moral values in 
educational settings. As shown, neuroscientific research focusing on psychological processes 
associated with values and virtues can inform us, who are interested in developing effective 
interventions, which processes should be aimed in the interventions (Han et al., 2019; Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2020). Likewise, at the practical level, neuroscience can make significant 
contributions to designing educational programs and policies to promote desirable public value 
with empirical evidence (Han et al., 2019). 
Concluding Remarks 
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So far, in this paper, I have briefly reviewed several previous psychological and 
neuroscientific studies that addressed topics related to public value. Particularly, I have focused 
on research in describing values shared across different groups of people and how to address 
conflicts regarding diverse values in a more effective way. In addition, I also reviewed previous 
studies related to how to promote values and virtues among people through education in an 
effective way. Although findings from previous studies in psychology and neuroscience per se 
would not be able to provide us with complete answers to our questions about norms and 
prescriptions, which can perhaps be better addressed by moral philosophy, at the practical level, 
they can provide useful insights about how to better understand processes associated with public 
value and how to promote them through education and policy making. Hence, we need to 
promote interdisciplinary collaboration embracing philosophical and empirical works addressing 
public value to improve research on public value in the long term. 
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